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: Unlocking the Eighth Amendment

UNLOCKING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S POWER TO MAKE
INNOCENCE A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM: THE 'OBJECTIVE' VIEWS
OF STATE LEGISLATORS
David Niven, Ph.D.*
In a long series of death penalty and other similar cases, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that state legislative action shapes the
operative meaning of the Eighth Amendment.' In short, if a particular punishment
is acceptable to state legislators, then it does not offend our "evolving standards of
decency,"2 and therefore is not cruel and unusual. If, however, legislators have
deemed a punishment unacceptable, it loses our evolving society's imprimatur, and
therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.
Meanwhile, in a second series of cases, the Court has failed to identify a
constitutional bar to executing an innocent person. Rather, the Court has held that
a claim of innocence, indeed evidence of innocence, is insufficient to warrant
remedy without an identified reversible error.
Here, I assert that the Court need only apply the first line of cases to the second
to produce a constitutional bar to executing the innocent. That is, my analysis of
state legislation and of the survey responses of state legislators reveals an
overwhelming aversion to executing the innocent. Thus, as the Court's proxy for
society's conscience, legislators imbue the Eighth Amendment with the
unmistakable power, and the Court with the clear duty, to prevent the execution of
innocent people.
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I demonstrates that the Court has deemed
legislative action as "objective" evidence of the Eighth Amendment's meaning.
Part II notes the Court's position that innocence is not an actionable constitutional
*
David Niven is a visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati. The
author thanks Richard Paschal and Eric Kasper for their insightful comments on a previous draft.
See generally Kimberly Bliss, The Supreme Court's Rationale in Capital Cases: A One Way Street?,
1.
30 PACE L. REV. 1315 (2010); see also Chelsea Creo Sharon, Note, The "Most Deserving" of Death: The
Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statues, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 243 (2011).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
2.
As critics and several Justices have asserted, this is a rather circular proposition in which whatever the
3.
states choose to do is acceptable because they choose to do it. For examples see David Niven, Jeremy Zilber &
Kenneth Miller, A "Feeble Effort to Fabricate National Consensus": The Supreme Court's Measurement of
Current Social Attitudes Regarding the Death Penalty, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 83 (2006).
4.
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006); Dist. Att'y's Office
for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009); In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009). For a review see
Joshua M. Lott, Note, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 443 (2010).
5.
Craig M. Jacobs, Comment, The Constitutionality of Collateral Post-Conviction Claims of Actual
Innocence, 42 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455 (2011).
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basis for appeal. Part III describes a review of state capital punishment legislation
and the results from a survey of state legislators. Part IV asserts that the legislation
and the responses of state legislators represent the missing cog that animates the
Eighth Amendment and renders innocence a constitutional claim.
I. LEGISLATORS DEFINE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

While the Court's holding that the Eighth Amendment reflects our society's
"evolving standards of decency"6 remains a controversial assertion to some
Supreme Court Justices, the means of measuring society's standards has produced
an enduring consensus.
In Coker v. Georgia and subsequent cases, the Court repeatedly held that
society's standards of decency must be measured with "objective factors," and
chief among those factors is state legislative action.7 In Coker, the Court asserted
that the "public judgment as to the acceptability" of punishment is "evidenced by
the ... legislative reaction in a large majority of the States."8
The Court noted in Penry v. Lynaugh that "legislation

. . .

is an objective

indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely."9 Indeed, "national
consensus" can be found by scrutinizing "the operative acts (laws and the
application of laws) that the people have approved." 0
The Court has not only ceded this particular judgment to state legislators, it
specifically rendered its own views irrelevant because "[i]t will rarely if ever be the
case that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the evolution in
views of the American people than do their elected representatives.""
II. INNOCENCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

Attorneys representing Leonel Herrera argued that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prevents the execution of a
potentially innocent person.12 Mr. Herrera's counsel also argued that he was owed
the chance to at least present his new evidence before a judge. 13 The Court-as it
had in numerous death penalty cases before-noted that it "'exercis[es] substantial
deference to legislative judgments in this area."'l 4 However, rather than consider
the degree to which legislators would accept the prospect of a potentially innocent
defendant on .death row, the Court limited its attention to the procedural rules in
place.' 5
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
433 U.S. 584, 592-95 (1977).
Id. at 594.
492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989).
Thompson v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 407-08.
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Thus, without aid of any legislative perspective on the issue at hand, the Court
found that actual innocence was not grounds for federal relief, and that defendants
have no constitutional right to make use of newly available evidence that casts
doubt on a conviction. 6
Writing for the majority in Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that
"[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been
held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding." 7 Innocence, then,
"is not itself a constitutional claim," but rather a "gateway" to having a
"constitutional claim considered on the merits."' 8 Emphasizing this point, the Court
noted, "This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-notto
correct errorsoffact."' 9
In other words, an error of fact-even an error of fact pertaining to an actually
innocent defendant in a capital case-is not a matter of constitutional concern. It is,
as Justice Scalia explained in his Herrera concurrence, an "unhappy truth that not
every problem was meant to be solved by the United States Constitution, nor can
be." 20
Scholars have raised concerns that the Herrera decision-and subsequent
affirmations of the principle that innocence is not a constitutional claim 2 - levates
the achievement of finality over the pursuit of justice.22 Indeed, the Herrera Court
Id at 393.
16.
17.
Id. at 400 (emphasis added). In a concurring opinion in Herrera, Justice Scalia went even further by
stating: "There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in
the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought
forward after conviction." Id. at 427-28. In the dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote that the prospect of executing an
innocent person was "shocking to the conscience." Id. at 430. Justice Scalia replied with unalloyed sarcasm, "If the
system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 'shock[s]' the dissenters' consciences .
. . perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of 'conscience
shocking' as a legal test." Id. at 428.
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
18.
19.
Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
20.
Id. at 428 (citing Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 352 (1981).
See generally House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006); District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial
21.
District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009); In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009). In House, the Court set an all but
impossible to meet evidentiary standard required to assert innocence, then affirmed that if that standard is met, the
appellee must still advance a constitutional claim. See generally 547 U.S. 518. In Osborne, the Court found that a
defendant has no right to access DNA evidence in the state's possession that could prove his innocence. 557 U.S.
52. In Davis, the Court demonstrated some unease at the prospect of a potentially innocent person facing
execution. 130 S. Ct. 1. Troy Davis' appeal drew international attention and support from an array of strange
political bedfellows including President Jimmy Carter, Representative Bob Barr, Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu,
and former FBI director William Sessions. Id at 1. Davis was granted an evidentiary hearing by the Court. Id.
However, in Davis, and in other capital cases in which innocence is asserted, the Court has failed to articulate a
constitutional principle that bars the execution of the innocent and grants associated rights to appellees. Id. In that
regard, author Joshua Lott labels the Davis decision "hollow." Lott, supra note 4, at 446; see also Lee Kovarsky,
Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329 (2010); Jacobs, supra note 5.
See JENNIFER CULBERT, DEAD CERTAINTY: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT
22.
(2008); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Roberts Court's FailedInnocence Project, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 43 (2010). Jacobs
encapsulates a widely-held scholarly view: "There are certainly wise and just reasons to limit the availability of
habeas review, such as finality, comity, and the like, but to suggest that the Constitution does not recognize actual
innocence as a valid claim on habeas review is to circumscribe the essential mandate of the Eighth Amendmentthat the state respect human dignity when it punishes." Jacobs, supra note 5, at 492.
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explicitly warns, "Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than
to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence."23
The window for death penalty appeals-whether grounded in innocence or any
other grounds-closed even tighter with the passage of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).24 For those appealing a capital
sentence, AEDPA created new time limits and procedural limits, such as the
number of petitions and the grounds for habeas relief 25 AEDPA also mandated
that federal courts operate with deference to state courts.26
The combined weight of the Court's rulings and the implementation of
AEDPA provide strong foundation to Justice Scalia's unremitting assertion that
"this Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted
defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas
court that he is 'actually' innocent." 27
To scholars, the Court's rulings on innocence represent a rather callous
limitation on the practical value of the Eighth Amendment. 28 Under this
formulation, the Eighth Amendment protects procedural integrity while offering
nothing more than indifference to personal injustice.29
This apparent "tension between procedure and substance"3 0 could potentially
be resolved by turning to the Court's designated arbiters of the Eighth
Amendment-the state legislators. Logically, the Court must apply the same state
23.
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added). The Herrera case would resurface as an issue at the
confirmation hearings for Chief Justice nominee John Roberts. See generally Second Day of Hearings on the
Nomination of Judge Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/
politicsspeciall/13text-roberts.html?pagewanted=all. Roberts faced a series of questions about his brief in support
of the prosecution in the Herrera case. Id. Senator Leahy and Senator Durbin both pressed Roberts to explain
whether the Constitution permits the execution of an innocent person. See generally Third Day of Hearingson the
Nomination of Judge Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/14/politics/
politicsspeciall/14text-roberts.htm?pagewanted=all. Even when repeatedly challenged, Roberts refused to deny
the assertion. Id.
24.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) OF 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 28 U.S.C.).
25.
Id.
26.
Justice Stevens, in his In re Davis concurrence, argues that AEDPA may be unconstitutional as it
applies to the innocent on death row. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1. Numerous scholars have articulated concerns
regarding AEDPA, suggesting that it is productive mainly of injustice. See Krystal M. Moore, Is Saving an
Innocent Man a "Fool's Errand"? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act on an
Original Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 197 (2011); Jacobs, supra note 5; Angela Ellis,
"Is Innocence Irrelevant" to AEDPA's Statute of Limitations? Avoiding a Miscarriage of Justice in Federal
Habeas Corpus, 56 VILL. L. REV. 129 (2011).
27.
In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28.
See generally Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? As Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's
ContinuingProblems with FederalHabeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817 (1993). Indeed, many
scholars have forcefully called for a broadening of defendants' rights in capital cases. See Stefanie Lindeman,
Because Death is Different: Legal and Moral Arguments for Broadening Defendants' Rights to Discovery in
FederalCapitalCases, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 541 (1999); Robert Hardaway, Beyond a Conceivable Doubt: The
Questfor a Fairand ConstitutionalStandardof Proofin Death Penalty Cases, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 221 (2008).

29.
While the Supreme Court has averred that commutation offers protection against any potential
miscarriage of justice in capital cases, scholars warn that the practical political costs of leniency are too much to
bear for most governors. See Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to EnsureJustice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996).
30.
Hoffman, supra note 28, at 820.
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legislative test of the Eighth Amendment here that the Court has used to determine
if rapists can be executed, 3' if the mentally retarded can be executed,32 and if
minors can be executed.33
III. LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ON INNOCENCE

Researchers have studied state legislators' death penalty policy positions and
policymaking priorities from a number of angles. Legislators have mostly been
found to be supportive of the death penalty and to align themselves on the issue in
similar proportion to the general public. 34 However, legislators have also
demonstrated a susceptibility to alternatives and counter arguments on the death
penalty.3 1 What has not been established in previous work is the degree to which
innocence issues affect legislators' considerations.
To assess state legislators' beliefs about innocence in death penalty cases, I
have reviewed capital punishment statutes in the thirty-two states with the death
penalty and conducted a survey of legislators to record their personal views on the
matter.
A. Legislation

A review of capital punishment statutes in the states that impose death
sentences reveals unanimity in the intention of these states' legislators to apply the
sentence only to those who are factually guilty. 36 Indeed, of the thirty-two death
penalty states, thirty-two permit a sentence of death only for the commission of an
act of murder, the perpetration of the act, or for killing another.37 No state permits
a capital sentence based solely on a conviction of murder. 38

31.
See generally Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
32.
See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
33.
See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
34.
Timothy J. Flanagan, Pauline Gasdow Brennan & Debra Cohen, Conservatism and CapitalPunishment
in the State Capitol: Lawmakers and the Death Penalty, 72 PRISON J. 37 (1992).
35.
See John T. Whitehead, 'Good 01' Boys' and the Chair: Death Penalty Attitudes ofPolicy Makers in
Tennessee, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 245 (1998); Jeffrey Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of
Legislative Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2006-2007); David J.
Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 U. KAN. L.
REV. 443 (1988-1989).
36.
See Table 1.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
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TABLE 1
DEFINING A CAPITAL OFFENSE IN STATE STATUTES

Death Penalty
States Using
"Committed"
Language

22

AL: "committed by the defendant."3 9
AZ: "defendant committed the offense ... .40
AR: "A person commits ....

"The murder was committed . ...

FL:
GA:
ID:
KY:

PA:

"The capital felony was committed .... ".
"murder was committed... ."4
"murder was committed... ." 46
"The offense of murder or kidnapping was committed
by a person with ....
"The killing was committed ... ,.48
"A person commits the crime of murder ... .49
"A person commits the offense of deliberate
homicide. .5." 0
"Murder ... [p]erpetrated ... committed. ."
"The offense was committed..." 52
"The murder was committed...,,53
"death of the decedent was committed
deliberately.. . ."54
"The defendant committed. . . ."

SC:

"The murder was committed . .

SD:
TN:
TX:

"The offense was committed. . . 57
"The murder was committed. . . .s
"A person commits an offense if the person
commits murder ...5

NV:
OH:
OK:
OR:

48.

ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-5-40(1-4) (2012).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F)(5-7, 11-12) (2012).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a) (West 2012).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(a) (2012).
DEL. CODE ANN. II §4209(e)(1)(a-f)(2012).
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(a) (2012).
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (2012).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(b, d) (2012).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(1) (2012).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(9)(a-b) (2012).

49.

Mo. ANN. STAT. §565.020(1) (2012).

50.
51.

MONT. CODE ANN.

52.
53.
54.
55.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2012).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21 § 701.12 (2012).

47.

56.

57.
58.
59.

42

DE:

LA:
MO:
MT:

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

41

CO: "A person commits the crime of murder. . .

§ 45-5-102(1)

. .

(West 2012).

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 15 § 200.030(1)(a-b) (West 2011).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 16 § 163.150(1)(b)(A) (2012).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (d)(13) (2012).
S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (2012).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(1) (2012).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(1) (2012).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(A) (2011).
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Death Penalty
States Using
"Perpetrated"
Language

3

Death Penalty
States Using
"Killing"/
"Causes the
Death"
Language

7

States without
Death Penalty

219

WY: "The murder was committed by a person...,,60
CA: "murder which is perpetrated by means of ..
MS: "Murder which is perpetrated by. . . ."62
NC: "A murder which shall be perpetrated by. .63
"A person who: knowingly or intentionally kills
another human being...
KS: "Capital murder is the: Intentional and
premeditated killing .. 65
"66
NE: "he or she kills another person .
NH: "A person is guilty of capital murder if he
. . ."
knowingly causes the death of.
killing
. . . ."68
VA: "willful, deliberate, and premeditated
. . . .' 69
causes
knowingly
or
UT: "actor intentionally
WA: "he or she causes the death . . . .,70
IN:

18

Table 1 encapsulates this requirement based on the text of the thirty-two capital
punishment statutes. Most typical is language requiring the defendant to have
"committed" the act.71 Among the twenty-two states with similar language is
Indiana, which provides for a death sentence if the defendant "kills another human
being while committing or attempting to commit," and then enumerates a list that
includes arson, burglary, rape, etc.72 Three states substitute the word "perpetrated"
for committed.73 The remaining seven death penalty states include language
directly referencing the act of killing.74 Typical formulations include Virginia's
approach that makes a death sentence available for the "willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing" of several categories of victims including "law enforcement
officer[s]," "more than one person," and "any person in the commission of
robbery."

60.

WYo. STAT. ANN. 1977 §6-2-101(a) (2012). [6-2-102(i)]

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2012).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(a) (West 2012).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-17(A) (West 2012).
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(1) (West 2012).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5401(a)(1) (West 2012).
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-303 (West 2012).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1(1) (2013).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(1) (West 2012).

69.

UTAH CODE ANN. 1953

70.
71.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(a) (West 2012).
See Table 1.

72.

IND. CODE ANN.

73.
74.
75.

See Table 1.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(1, 4, 5) (West 2012).

§ 76-3-207(2)(a)

§ 35-42-1-1 (West
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A handful of states do make at least some mention of imposing capital
sentences on those "convicted" of murder.76 However, in every one of these
instances the law explicitly defines the aggravating circumstances necessary to
sustain a death sentence in terms of the commission of the act.77 All told,
legislators in all fifty states have set their statutes in opposition to executing a
defendant merely upon conviction for a capital crime. That is, as shown in table 1,
eighteen states do not impose the death penalty and all thirty-two death penalty
states require the actual commission of the charged act, rather than a mere

conviction. 7 8
Legislative revulsion to seeing capital sentences imposed on the innocent is
apparent in other legislative efforts as well. Legislators in forty-eight of the fifty
states, and all thirty-two death penalty states, have recently passed a version of a
DNA evidence access bill, providing some measure of post-conviction access to
DNA evidence in the hopes of preventing the incarceration or execution of an
innocent defendant.79 Meanwhile, Idaho's legislature so abhors the possibility of
executing an innocent person that it has elevated the act of perjury in a capital case
that results in the execution of an innocent person into a capital offense.o
Remorse over punishing the innocent has inspired numerous other legislative
responses, including one Pennsylvania state representative's bill that would
compensate victims of wrongful conviction at a rate of $141 per day of
incarceration-a sum that happens to be the per diem rate paid to state legislators.
B. Survey Responses
While sentencing statutes suggest state legislators unambiguously intend to
reserve the death penalty exclusively for those who committed the offense at hand,
the degree to which legislators abhor the prospect of sending an innocent person to
death row can most clearly be documented by simply asking them.
Fortuitously, to a surprising degree, state legislators have proven themselves
accessible to scholarly inquiries.82 Scores of studies have been published based
largely on the willingness of legislators to share their views on politics and

76.
See DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 4209 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.02 (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21 § 701.9 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-20 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.
1953 §76-3-207 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. 1977 § 6-2-101 (2012).
77.
See DEL. CODE ANN. 11 §4209 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.02 (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21 §701.9 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-20 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.
1953 §76-3-207 (2012); WYo. STAT. ANN. 1977 § 6-2-101 (2012).
78.
See Table 1.
79.
DNA Testing and the Death Penalty, A.C.L.U. (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/capitalpunishment/dna-testing-and-death-penalty.
80.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5411 (2012).
81.
Press Release, Penn. House of Representatives, McGeehan, Waters want Compensation, Exoneration
Plans for Wrongfully Imprisoned (Jan. 25, 2011). State representative Mike McGeehan introduced HB199 on
January 25, 2011. Id. It did not win approval.
82.
Maestas and her colleagues found more than 14,000 state legislative respondents to scholarly queries in
their survey of the literature. See Cherie Maestas, Grant W. Neeley & Lilliard E. Richardson, The State of
Surveying Legislators: Dilemmas and Suggestions, 3 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 90 (2003).
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process.83 Here, I construct two samples of state legislators to inquire about
innocence and the death penalty.
In conventional social science research, a survey of legislators might target a
random sample in order to provide a fair representation of legislators more
generally. However, Justice Scalia and the conservative wing of the Court have
boldly claimed that while the Eighth Amendment is defined by state legislators,
only the views of legislators from death penalty states are pertinent. For example,
when the Court counted how many states rejected the execution of the mentally
retarded, Justice Scalia objected to including states without capital punishment in
the tally. As he colorfully explained in his Atkins v. Virginia dissent,
Consulting States that bar the death penalty concerning the
necessity of making an exception to the penalty for offenders
under 18 is rather like including old-order Amishmen in a
consumer-preference poll on the electric car. Of course they don't
like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point at issue.84
To satisfy the preferred methodological standards both of social scientists and
of Justice Scalia, here I employ two separate samples. First, I constructed a random
sample of state legislators from the fifty states. Second, I constructed what I am
calling my "Scalia sample" by removing members of the random sample who hail
from non-death penalty states and replacing them with a random selection of like
numbers from among the then thirty-four death penalty states.
Both samples include a total of 400 legislators. To maximize participation rates
(as demonstrated in previous state legislative surveys)," legislators were contacted
both by phone and email. Members of the sample were first alerted of my interest
in speaking to them by email one week before I attempted to reach them by phone
to request a brief interview. If a telephone interview could not be arranged, I sent
the questions in a second email message. Up to five email reminders were then sent
if a response was not received.
In total, 287 legislators in the random sample and 313 from the Scalia sample
responded between November 1, 2011 and April 16, 2012. The response rates for
the two groups were 71.8% and 78.2% respectively.86
In order to maximize the likelihood of responses, legislators were told that their
participation in this study would require no more than five minutes of their time

Id.
83.
543 U.S. 551, 610-11 (2005) (Scalia, dissenting).
84.
85.
See Edmund F. McGarrell & Maria Sandys, The Misperception of Public Opinion Toward Capital
Punishment: Examining the Spuriousness Explanation of Death Penalty Support, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 500
(1996); Nell H. Gottlieb et al., State Legislators' Beliefs about Legislation that Restricts Youth Access to Tobacco
Products,30 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 209 (2003).

These response rates are not inconsistent with the results other researchers have achieved when
86.
contacting legislators on policy-centered topics. For example, in a study of legislators' perceptions of public views
on the death penalty, McGarrell and Sandys reached 75% of their sample. See McGarrell & Sandys, supranote 85.
In a study of views on tobacco sales restrictions, Gottlieb and his colleagues reached 84% of their sample. See
Gottlieb et al., supranote 85.
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and they were assured that they would not be personally identified. Indeed, the
survey itself consisted of only three questions on the death penalty.
Question One
Do you support the continued use of the death penalty in XX state? [Or, would
you support legislation creatinga death penalty in XY state?]
Question Two
In your opinion, what is an acceptableerrorrate when determiningthe guilt of
defendantsfacing a potentialdeath sentence?
Question Three
Do you believe it is permissible under the Constitution to execute someone if
there are doubts regardinghis guilt?
The survey results paint a picture of legislators' views that aligns quite closely
with the text of state statutes. That is, they do not intend to impose death
sentences on innocent defendants and are, in point of fact, repulsed by the notion.88
Both the overall sample and the Scalia sample report majority support for the
death penalty. When asked whether they support maintaining the death penalty in
their state (or creating a death penalty if not currently in place), the overall sample
responded with 58% in support. 90 The Scalia sample-drawn exclusively from
death penalty states-produced 63% support for the death penalty.91
Between two samples with no shortage of support for the death penalty,
however, there was no support for executing the innocent. 92 When asked what the
acceptable error rate is for imposing death sentences, the mean response for the
overall sample was .02.9 That is, one error per 5,000 cases. Moreover, the modal
response, in fact the near universal response, was zero. 9 4

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Table 1.
Death Penalty Survey Results (Apr. 16, 2012) (on file with author).
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Survey Results, supra note 88.
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TABLE 2
SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATORS
Overall Sample

Scalia Sample

(n=287)

(n=313)

Support the Death
Penalty

58% yes

63% yes

Acceptable Error
Rate

.02 mean
(96% responded: zero/none)

.03 mean
(93% responded:
zero/none)

Constitution
Permits Execution

95% no

94% no

with Doubt

The Scalia sample was similarly inclined, with a mean response of .03. That
equates to one error per 3,333 cases.96 Again, the modal response was still zero
errors.97
When asked if the Constitution permits the execution of someone whose guilt
is in doubt, the overwhelming majority of legislators in both samples responded
negatively.98 Many legislators were incredulous that the acceptability of imposing
the death sentence on an innocent defendant could even be debated. 99
*

"You can't unring a bell."

*"You see this andyou just have to say 'Whoa.
* "We shouldn't use it if there is a chance of executing an innocentperson."
* "Civilized society cannot-shouldnot-accept this."
*"What have we gained when we pile a wrong on top of a wrong? Who is
served by that? No one is served, not the victim, not society, and surely not
the new victim of a badprosecution."
Several legislators were quick to underscore that there is a world of difference
between being a supporter of the death penalty and being indifferent to questions of
innocence. 00
not soft on crime. But we cannot undo an execution."
*"I want to make sure we put the rightpeople to death."
*"I'm

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Survey Results, supra note 88.
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*"It would be wrong if we didn't learn a lessonfrom these exonerations. We'd
be weakening the whole criminaljustice system."
*"If you do the crime, you do the time. But I am also a firm believer that we
must be sure he has done the crime. "
*"I have to be certain, myself that we're not taking innocent peoples' lives.
Otherwise,just what are we allowing to happen?"
In sum, state legislators are not sympathetic to the conclusion that the death
penalty can be imposed without regard to factual guilt. Rather, they believe: (1)
that the death penalty should only be imposed on those for whom guilt is not in
doubt; and (2) that neither they nor the Constitution tolerates errors in capital
cases.' 0'
IV. INNOCENCE AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

On its face, this presentation suggests an effort to knock down a straw man. Is
there really anyone who would speak up for executing the innocent?1 0 2
Nevertheless, demonstrating that legislators do not think executing an innocent
person is acceptable is a vital step toward asserting a constitutional bar to executing
the innocent.
The Court has ruled "'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim" 0 3
and state legislative action is a guide to the practical meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. 1 Here I contend that legislators definitively reject the legitimacy of
imposing capital punishment on innocent defendants-therefore, under the Court's
logic-the Eighth Amendment must be seen as providing constitutional relief
against the execution of an innocent defendant. In both the text of enacted
legislation and in the words of legislators, mistakes in capital punishment cases are
seen as intolerable.' 0 5 Any effort to execute someone based merely on a conviction
defies the language, intent, and beliefs of state legislators, and therefore violates
the Eighth Amendment.' 06

101.
Id.
102.
Though Justice Scalia certainly seems to approach this position when he mocks his colleagues for "the
reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less
the execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no avail, all the process that our society has
traditionally deemed adequate.",102 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Similarly,
in Kansas v. Marsh, Justice Scalia takes aim at those who would hold the capital punishment system to a standard
of "100% perfection." 198 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
103.
Herrera,506 U.S. at 404.
104.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595 (1977).
105.
See Table 1; Survey Results, supra note 88.
106.
Also worth noting is Geimer and Amsterdam's 1987 finding that the leading factor in whether jurors
supported a death sentence was their confidence in the defendant's guilt. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Trials, 15 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1 (1989). Similarly, authors Soss, Langbein, and Metecko found support for the death penalty in general
varied with the respondent's confidence that government could correctly identify guilty defendants. See Joe Soss,
Laura Langbein & Alan R. Metelko, Why Do White Americans Support the Death Penalty?,65 J. POL. 397 (2003).
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While scholars have pointed to the potential of innocence claims and innocence
rates to redefine death penalty jurisprudence,1 07 and have specifically asserted that
the intersection of innocence and the Eighth Amendment is where this matter will
be settled, 08 this analysis represents a unique effort to apply the conclusions of
state legislators to the operative meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Some hail the arrival of the "innocence revolution,"l 09 even as critics assert that
talk of innocence is nothing more than a workaround intended to advance the
abolition of the death penalty.'" 0 But as Soss, Langbein, and Metecko note, "The
legal and political viability of capital punishment hinges on both its consequences
in practice and its meaning in the public mind.""' More importantly, the Court
defines the 'public mind' as the mind of legislators, and those minds support the
death penalty only as it is exclusively applied to the factually guilty.
Legislators believe in their own responsibility to limit the death penalty to the
factually guilty. And they believe in the Court's responsibility to do no less. As one
legislator in the survey put it: "The courts don't want to hear about a substantial
claim of innocence! That's unacceptable. We're not racing to churn widgets off an
assembly line here. There's no question more important when we're imposing a
death sentence.""12

107.
See Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional Rights of the
Family Members ofDeath Row Prisoners, 16 PUB. INT. L. J. 195 (2007); Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty,
By Risking Execution of the Innocent, Violate Substantive Due Process?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1359 (2003-2004);
Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Norms,
Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1 (2001).
108.
Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and our 'Evolving Standards of
Decency' in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265 (2003-2004).
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573
109.
(2003-2004).

110.

Ward A. Campbell, Exoneration Inflation: Justice Scalia's Concurrence in Kansas v. Marsh, 2 J. INST.

ADVANCEMENT CRIM. JUST. 49 (2008).

Ill.
112.

Soss et al., supra note 106, at 415.
Survey Results, supra note 88.
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